Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 1

Issue 3

Article 6

5-15-1974

Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District
Patrick Callahan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick Callahan Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District , 1 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 3
(1974)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Lindros v. Governing Board of
Torrance Unified School District

I. INTRODUCTION

Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District'
is a case related to the California administrative law regarding
teacher employment rights. Specifically, it relates to the termination of a probationary high school teacher for reading a short story
entitled "The Funeral," to a coeducational tenth grade high school
English class, for instructional purposes. The story contained offensive, indecent and vulgar language. The main issues were whether
the disciplinary action taken was a violation of the teacher's rights
to academic freedom under the First Amendment, and whether
there was sufficiency of notice of the proscribed conduct where
there was no specific school board standard as to what readings
were impermissible.

II.

BACKGROUND

The employment rights of school teachers in California are protected by the Education Code. To fill educational positions, the
local governing board may only select persons who meet the edu2
cational and administrative requirements of the Education Code.
Teachers initially have probationary status; later they achieve
permanent status, often referred to as tenure. Permanent status
is achieved by (1) employment by the school district for three complete, consecutive school years in a position requiring certain qualifications, and (2) being selected for the next (fourth) school year
to a position requiring certain qualifications.3 The purpose of the
probationary status is to assure that those who are hired as permanent teachers are able to perform at least adequately in the
teaching profession. The problem, and the reason for statutory
protection of the teacher's employment rights, is that "it is not inconceivable that a qualified-even a highly qualified-person may
1. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr.185 (1973).
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12901-12909 (West Supp. 1974) amending §§
12902-12905 (West 1969).
3. CAL. EDUC.CODE § 13304 (West 1969).
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. . . for reasons having no relation to his
be victim of dismissal
4
fitness as a teacher."

In order to protect the teacher from unjust dismissal, he
is granted the following rights by the Education Code:5
1) Written notice prior to May 15 that he will not be hired for
the following year.
2) He may request a statement of the reasons for not reemploying him.
3) He may request a hearing before the governing board to determine if there is cause for not reemploying him.
4) The cause for not reemploying him must be related solely
to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof.
In summary, ,the dismissed (or not rehired) probationary teacher
has a right to notice, cause and a hearing. It is these rights that
Lindros asserted in his petition for a writ of mandate.
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and appellant, Stanley M. Lindros, was a probationary

secondary school teacher in Torrance, California. 6 In March, 1970,
the defendant Governing Board of the Torrance Unified School
District served Lindros with written notice that it was recommending ithat he not be reemployed for the next school year. Lindros
requested a hearing, which was held by a hearing officer of the
state Office of Administrative Procedure in May, 1970. The hearing officer submitted his proposed decision to the board, in which
he made findings of fact and a determination that the three charges
which were sustained by the evidence were related to the welfare
of the school and the pupils thereof. The principle charge was
that Lindros read to his tenth grade English class a short story
entitled "The Funeral" which he had written himself, which contained a coarse and vulgar phrase, specifically: white mother
fuckin' pig. The governing board in turn determined that
4. Coan, Dismissal of California ProbationaryTeachers, 15 HAST. L.J.
284 (1964).
5. CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 13443 (West Supp. 1974) amending § 13443.
6. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 103

Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1972).

...sufficient cause exists pursuant to Section 13443 of the Education Code not to reemploy respondent [Lindros] for the 1970-71
school year in that each of the charges found by the hearing officer to be sustained by the evidence
and related to the welfare of
the schools and the pupils thereof.7
Lindros next 'applied to the Superior Court for -a writ of mandate
to compel the governing board to set aside its decision not to rehire him. In the mandamus proceeding, the Superior Court found
that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's
finding of fact as to the principle charge. (The two other charges
were not found to be pertinent by the California Supreme Court,
and are omitted from the present discussion.) As a conclusion of
law, the Superior Court held that the hearing officer's findings
of fact related to the two charges involved were supported by substantial evidence and that the charges "were found to be related
to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof, and the Governing Board's determination of sufficiency isi conclusive.",, In
short, the Superior Court upheld the governing board and denied
the writ of mandate.
Lindros next appealed to the Court of Appeal, Second District.
After considering the issues of academic freedom, due process and
some pertinent statutory aspects of California administrative law,
this court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Reading of
a story with a vulgar phrase was without the pale of academic
freedom, was conduct which related to the welfare of the school
and the pupils thereof, and constituted cause for declining to rehire a probationary teacher. 9
Lindros appealed next to the California Supreme Court. In an
opinion by Justice Tobriner, the court held that the incident for
which Lindros was disciplined did not establish cause for termination which was reasonably related to the welfare of the schools
and pupils thereof, and remanded the case to the Superior Court
for further proceedings. 10 There was 'a dissent by Justice Burke,
in which Justice McComb concurred, taking the position that the
Education Code" gave the local school board the authority to determine the sufficiency of the cause for refusing to reemploy a
2
probationary teacher, without judicial interference.
7. Id. at 193.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 195.
10. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 541, 510 P.2d 361, 372, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 196 (1973).

11. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443 (d) (West Supp. 1974).
12. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 541, 510 P.2d 361, 372, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 196 (1973).
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Certiorari was denied to the Lindros case by the United States
Supreme Court on December 17, 1973.13
IV. REASONING OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals, Second District, in the opinion by Justice
Ford, reviewed four basic contentions of the appellant, Lindros,
in its reasoning on the charge relating to the reading of "The
Funeral":
1) Refusal to rehire plaintiff because of his reading of "The Funeral" constituted a violation of academic freedom protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
2) Reading of "The Funeral" could not be a basis for refusal
to rehire plaintiff because he was not given adequate notice that
conduct of that nature would subject him to disciplinary action.
3) The board's decision is void because it determined that there
was sufficient cause not to rehire plaintiff without reading the
transcript of the proceedings before the hearing officer.
4) The governing board violated the Brown Act (Government
Code Sections 54950-54960), by deliberating while in executive session.
The Issue of Academic Freedom
Plaintiff cited two federal cases in support of his argument that
4
there was a violation of academic freedom. Parducci v. Rutland1
involved a high school teacher who assigned outside reading in
books which contained several vulgar words and a reference to
an involuntary act of sexual intercourse. The court stated that
academic freedom was a special concern of the First Amendment,
subject however to balancing against the question of whether the
conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."
The court found that the conduct for which the plain-

tiff in Parducci was dismissed did not interfere with discipline in
13. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 9
Cal. 3d 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr' 185 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S.
Ct. 842 (1973).
14. 316 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
15. Id. at 355.

the school.1" Keefe v. Geanakos involved another high school
teacher who assigned reading of a magazine article which included
an offensive vulgar term, and held a discussion of the article in
a twelfth grade English class. The -issue as posed by the court
was "whether a teacher may, for demonstrated educational purposes, quote a 'dirty' word currently used in order to give special
offense, or whether the shock is too great for high school seniors
to stand. ' 17 The court, holding that academic freedom was indeed
at stake, reversed a decision of the district court denying an inter18
locutory judgment, and remanded the case.
The California Court of Appeals did not specifically address the
reasoning in Parducci. It did, however, make note of Mailloux v.
Kiley,'9 a later (1971) First Circuit case which appeared to modify
Keefe v. Geanakos:
The court in no way regrets its decision in Keefe v. Geanakos
[Citation], but it did not intend thereby to do away with what,
to use an old fashioned term, are considered the proprieties, or
to give carte blanche in the name of academic freedom to conduct
which can reasonably be deemed both offensive
and unnecessary
20
to the accomplishment of educational objectives.
The California Court of Appeals also distinguished Keefe v. Geanakos from Lindros in that in the former "the students were in
the twelfth grade and. . . the use of vulgar language could reason,ably be said to be justified in that it served a legitimate professional purpose."'2' In Lindros, the students were in the tenth
grade, and the story containing the vulgarity was to be a model
for writing by the students. The latter instance, it found, "substantially transcended any legitimate professional purpose and was
'22
without the pale of academic freedom.
The Issue of Adequate Notice
Plaintiff contended that he was not given adequate notice that
conduct such as reading a story containing a vulgar phrase would
subject him to disciplinary action. Instructional material had been
used at the school, and books were in the school library, which
contained words falling within the classification of vulgarity. Nevertheless, the court took the position that:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 356.
418 F.2d 359, 361 (lst Cir. 1969).
Id. at 363.
436 F.2d 565 (lst Cir. 1971).
Id. at 566.
103 Cal. Rptr. 188, 195 (1972).
Id. at 195.
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It is not unreasonable to assume that a person engaged in the profession of teaching will have a reasonable concept of generally accepted standards relating to propriety of conduct, including the
avoidance of vulgarity, and2 3 will adhere to such standards in his
relationship with his pupils.

The Issue of Failureto Follow the Statutory Procedure

Plaintiff contended that the governing board, by failing to read
the transcript of the administrative hearing prior to rendering a
decision not to rehire him, violated the procedure set forth in Government Code Section 11517, 'and failed to follow the requirements
of due process.
The thrust of plaintiff's contention was that there was a conflict
between the procedure prescribed by statute for such a hearing
and governing board action as set forth in the Education Code and
that in the Government Code. The Education Code gives the hearing officer the role of trier of fact only; the governing board makes
the decision as to "sufficiency and disposition".2 4 On the other

hand, the Government Code provides that if a contested case is
heard by a hearing officer alone, he must prepare a proposed deci25
sion in such form that it may be adopted as a decision in the case.
Plaintiff further contended that the procedure under the Government Code must be followed because it met federal due process
requirements 'and the Education Code procedure did not: "The one
who decides must hear. '26 Therefore, the members of the governing board were required to read the transcript of the proceedings
before the hearing officer because that officer was not empowered
to recommend an ultimate disposition and did not do so.27
The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's contention, finding support in the decision of the California Supreme Court in Bertch
v. Social Welfare Dept.28 That case arose out of an analogous conflict: whether a hearing to determine who was a "needy" person
under the Old Age Security Act was to be governed by Section
23. Id.
24. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443 (c) (West Supp. 1974), amending
(c) (West 1969).
25. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 11517 (b) (West 1966).

§ 13443

26. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
27. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 103

Cal. Rptr. 188, 196 (1972).
28. 45 Cal. 2d 524, 289 P.2d 485 (1955).

11517 of the Government Code, or sections 104.1, 104.2, 104.3 and
104.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 29 The Supreme Court
statement in Bertch quoted in Lindros0 appears right on point:
It would appear that under the situation here present where petitioners were given a full opportunity to be heard before the hearing officer whose report was then reviewed 3by
1 the board, there
was no denial of procedural due process of law.

It appears correct to find, as the Court of Appeals did, that by
analogy the Education Code procedure is to be followed in a hearing under Education Code Section 13443, and not the procedure

under the Government Code.
The Issue of the Secret Session
Plaintiff's last contention was that the governing board, by deliberating in executive session, after plaintiff had requested a hearing in open session, violated the Brown Act. In support of this
contention, plaintiff cited Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs.,3 2 which held that deliberation as well
as action were encompassed by the Brown Act (Government Code
Section 54950). The court defined deliberation as the examination,
weighing and reflecting upon the reasons for or against the
3
choice.3
The Court of Appeals countered with a reference to Huntington
34
Beach Unified High School Dist. v. Collins:
The record does not show that the board took any action toward
appellant's dismissal or heard any additional evidence pertaining
thereto at the executive session. The only decision reached during
the executive session was to allow appellant another opportunity
to answer the questions which he had failed to answer at the first
meeting. Then, during the second public hearing, appellant again
refused to answer the questions. After this second refusal, the
board approved a motion stating that appellant's answers were
evasive and that he should be suspended. If there was a technical
violation of the Brown Act (Gov. Code, §§ 54950-54960), it in no
way prejudiced appellant's rights and did not invalidate the action
of the board.
A technical violation of the Brown Act does not invalidate action
subsequently taken by the governing board.35
29. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 103
Cal. Rptr. 188, 197 (1972).
30. Id. at 198.
31. 45 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 289 P.2d 485, 488 (1955).
32. 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
33. Id. at 47, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
34. 202 Cal. App. 2d 677, 682, 21 Cal. Rptr. 56, 59 (1962).
35. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 103
Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (1972).
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V. REASONING OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
In deciding the Lindros case, the California Supreme Court took
sharp issue with the Court of Appeals on the issues of academic
freedom and due process. The California Supreme Court made its
decision on the academic freedom and due process issues, and did
not discuss the questions of proper administrative procedure.
Cause for Terminationis a Question of Law
Citing several California cases,86 the court stated that the courts
have consistently held that whether particular conduct establishes
cause for refusal to rehire a probationary teacher relates "solely
to -the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof" is a question
of law that must be determined by the courts.37 Further, the relation must adversely affect the welfare of the schools and pupils;
more than the simple relationship is required.8 The administrative agencies have restricted roles. The role of the hearing officer
together with the governing board is to determine findings of fact,
which will be upheld by the courts so long as supported by substantial evidence. The governing board alone determines "sufficiency of the cause". 9
Cause for Dismissal is not Found
The court made two main points in finding that there was no
cause for dismissal as a matter of law.
. First, it found that there was no adverse effect onthe
welfare
of schools and pupils. Words that are manifestly coarse and vulgar
are acceptable, if used for a bona fide educational purpose. Further,
in the Lindros case, there were no student or parent complaints
about the teacher's conduct in reading the story. Also, books con36. Griggs v. Board of Trustees of Merced Union H.S. Dist., 61 Cal. 2d
93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1964); Bekiaris v. Board of Education
of City of Modesto, 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972);
Blodgett v. Board of Trustees Tamalpais U.H.S. Dist., 20 Cal. App. 3d 183,
97 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1971); Thornton v. Board of Trustees of Snelling-Merced
Falls S.D., 262 Cal. App. 2d 761, 68 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1968).
37. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 9
Cal. 3d 524, 534, 510 P.2d 361, 367, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 191 (1973).
38. Id. at 535, 510 P.2d at 368, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
39. Id. at 534, 510 P.2d at 367, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 191.

taining similar words were in the school library. The court also
pointedout four United States Supreme Court cases, (principally
Cohen v. California) in which use of40 similar language was held
to be constitutionally protected speech.
Second, the court found that one isolated classroom use of material later deemed objectionable by school administrators, without
reasonable prior notice, is not sufficient ,as a matter of law to constitute cause for termination. The court quoted its prior decision
in Morrisonv. State Board of Education:
Teachers, particularly in the light of their professional expertise,

will normally be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates
unfitness to teach. Teachers are further protected by the fact that
they cannot be disciplined merely because they made a reasonable,
good faith, professional judgment in the course of
41 their employ-

ment with which higher authorities later disagreed.
In a footnote supporting this point,42 the court tied its reasoning
into the Federal cases of Keefe v. Geanakos,43 and Parducci v. Rutland,44 which had been cited by appellant in his behalf, but which
had been rejected or distinguished by the Court of Appeals. 45 The
Supreme Court found support in the federal cases which accepted
the notice argument in the context of constitutional due process
,and academic freedom challenges to teacher dismissals.
VI.

ANALYSIS

AND EVALUATION

The difference in the result obtained in the Supreme Court from
that obtained in'the Court of Appeals is primarily due to a sharp
difference in judgment as to the character of Lindros' conduct.
Both courts were exercising the right of the courts to review the
acts of the governing board to determine whether there was any
abuse of discretion in the board's determination that the cause for
dismissal related solely to the welfare of the schools and pupils
thereof. The result in either court reaffirms the leading cases, Rig47
gins46 and Griggs.
40. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,
408 U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
41. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 233, 461 P.2d 375,

Cal. Rptr. 175, 189 (1969).
42. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 9

389, 82

Cal. 2d 524, 538, 510 P.2d 361, 370, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 194 (1973).
43. 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969).
44. 316 F. Supp. 352, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
45. Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 103
Cal. Rptr. 188, 193 (1972).
46. 144 Cal. App. 2d 232, 300 P.2d 848 (1956).

47. 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1964).
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However, there is a sharp dichotomy as to what is concluded
as to the nature of Lindros' acts. The Court of Appeals states:
. .. it was not unreasonable to conclude that the embodiment of

vulgarity in a model of a story of the genre which the teacher

sought to have his students write substantially transcended any

legitimate professional purpose and was without the pale of academic freedom. Manifestly, such conduct
related to the welfare
48
of the schools and the pupils thereof.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court states:
In reading "The Funeral" petitioner sought to pursue a bona fide
educational purpose and in so doing did
49 not adversely affect the
welfare of the school and pupils thereof.
Were they reading the same story?
jective?

Are these matters that sub-

While reactions to four-letter words are certainly subjective
there are some other factors to be considered. The law was changing. The United States Supreme Court was moving fast in granting First Amendment protection to the use of four-letter words
in some situations. Cohen v. California" was decided in 1971; the
three other cases cited by the California Supreme Court relating

to four-letter words were decided in 1972.51
The Court of Appeals distinguished Lindros from Keefe on the
slim difference between the tenth and twelfth grades.5

2

It also

cited language in Mailloux which seemed to weaken appellant's reliance on Keefe; the decision in Mailloux, however, had the same
effect as that in Keefe: a teacher was granted an injunction allowing him to continue teaching until the court decided the case.5 3
It is not clear at all what Mailloux means; the clearest statement
is that "[t] he court in no way regrets its decision in Keefe v. Geanakos,''54 which supports appellant's case. Keefe and Parducci
were entitled to much greater weight in favor of academic freedom
and support of Lindros' appeal than they were given. The Court
of Appeals seems to have concluded that a school board was to
be given wide latitude in its determination of the appropriateness
48.

103 Cal. Rptr. 188, 195.

49. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 535, 510 P.2d 361, 368, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 192.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
9 Cal. 3d 524, 536, 510 P.2d 361, 369, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 193.
103 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194.
436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971).
Id. at 566.

of the conduct of a teacher in the classroom. This was properly
corrected by the decision of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court also differed sharply from the Court of Appeals as to whether there was reasonable prior notice that use of
vulgar language was impermissible in the classroom. The Court of
Appeals took the position that:
It is not unreasonable to assume that a person engaged in the profession of teaching will have a reasonable concept of generally accepted standards relating to propriety of conduct, including the
avoidance of vulgarity, and will adhere to such standards in his
relationship with his pupils. 55
The Supreme Court found no reason-able prior notice; it also held
that a single incident was insufficient grounds for disciplinary action. Only one California case was cited on the issue of due process
-Morrison v. State Board of Education.6 The objectionable conduct in that case was a homosexual act committed in private, outside of school, and not related to classroom conduct. However,
the court also cited several federal cases which accepted the notice argument in the context of constitutional due process and academic freedom challenges to teacher dismissals. 57 It seems clear
that classroom conduct is not cause for dismissal unless there is
more than a single instance of violation of clear school board policy
which is generally enforced in all classrooms.
That the Lindros case changed California law is forcefully stated
in the dissenting opinion by Justice Burke:
The majority have wholly emasculated the provisions of section
13443, subdivision (d) of the Education Code which, until now,
assured that a local school board's decision as to the sufficiency
of the cause for failure to reemploy a probationary teacher was
conclusive and free from judicial interference. 58
"Emasculation" is perhaps too strong a term. But the court did
more than state that in a conflict between First Amendment academic freedom and Section 13443, that academic freedom will be
protected. A local board's decision as to what constitutes cause
is not conclusive, and is subject to review by the courts.
PATRICK CALLAHAN

55. 103 Cal. Rptr. 188, 19-5.
56. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
57. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Webb
v. Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
58. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 541, 510 P.2d 361, 372, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 196.

